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A Condominium Approach to Abyei
Jack McNeily*

Abstract
Despite the recent independence of the Republic of South Sudan (South Sudan)from the
Republic of Sudan (North Sudan), ongoing hostilities between the two states threatenprospects
for lasting peace. In particular,sovereignty disputes in Abyei, a resource-rich and culturally
important regionfalling on the North Sudanese-South Sudanese border,pose sgmficant risks
to the security ofAbyei residents and diminish the viability of long-term bilateralcooperation.
Although conflict in Abyei has existed alongside broader intra-Sudanese tensions for
several decades, the independence of South Sudan presents the possibilityfor a novel solution: a
"condominium" arrangementbetween the two states in Abyei. Whereas past solutions have
failed to provide a tolerable compromise between North Sudan and South Sudan as it existed
pre-independence, a condominium approach leverages this recent change in state structure and
builds upon existing agreements overAbyei to provide a pragmatic,bilateralsolution.
This Comment, then, addresses the viability and benefits of the condominium approach.
Beginning with a history of relevant background to the Abyei conflict andproceeding to outline
and apply theframework of condominium agreements over borderdisputes in internationallaw,
this Comment reconsiders the Abyeiproblem in context of a solution notpreviously considered.
This Comment builds upon the recent work of Joel Samuels, who arguesfor more robust
consideration of condominium solutions in contemporary internationaldisputes and seeks to
incorporate lessons from historical condominium agreements and broaderprincles of common
ownersho rights. Although there is significant literatureon early agreements and adjudications
regarding the Abyei conflict as it existed prior to South Sudan's independence, this Comment
seeks to take the next step and explore a condominium approach that incorporates many of the
provisions of such agreements and adjudications.

AB 2010, Dartmouth College; JD Candidate 2013, The University of Chicago Law School.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On July 9, 2011, the Republic of South Sudan (South Sudan) became an
independent country, separating from the Republic of Sudan (North Sudan) by
virtue of a popular referendum held six months earlier.' The independence
referendum was the key provision of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement
(CPA),2 an international arbitration undertaken to resolve a range of disputes
between northern and southern Sudan that plagued the state with civil war since
its own independence from Egypt and the UK in 1956.
Hostilities between northern and southern Sudan stemmed from regional
differences within the nation exacerbated by Sudan's governance under a
condominium arrangement between the UK and Egypt. The Anglo-Egyptian
condominium governed Sudan as two separate administrations, one northern
and one southern, thus cementing regional identification and intra-national

I

2

South Sudan's Flag Raised At Independence Ceremony (BBC Jul 9, 2011), online at
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14092375 (visited Apr 17, 2012).
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Sudan
and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Sudan People's Liberation Army Ch I, Part B,
§ 2.5 (2005) (unofficial codification) (CPA).
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hostilities. Civil war followed Sudan's independence as concerns over the just
distribution of resources compounded preexisting fears of regional domination.3
Intrastate violence centered on a few key regions, often where natural
resources were plentiful and the self-identification of local residents was divided;
the most prominent of these focal regions was Abyei. Unsurprisingly, disputes
over Abyei quickly came to represent the broader intrastate struggle. Two
principal groups of Sudanese claim historic ties to Abyei: the Ngok Dinka
people, who identify principally with the southern Sudanese, and the nomadic
Misseriya, who identify with the northern Sudanese.' Abyei is strategically
significant to both sides because the region falls in the geographic center of the
state and contains numerous rich oil deposits.
Despite a provision in the CPA that provided for a popular referendum to
determine the governance of Abyei to be held along with the independence
referendum that created South Sudan, no referendum has been held and a lasting
solution to Abyei has eluded the Sudanese.' The failure to have the referendum
as provided by the CPA and the subsequent failure of other proposed solutions
have provoked further violence in Abyei' and subjected the entire peace
agreement to uncertainty and instability.7 The dispute and its proposed solutions
have generally revived the impasse that defined the pre-independence conflict;
however, South Sudan's independence provides a novel solution heretofore not
considered by either party or international adjudicators.
The recent independence of South Sudan presents a new alternative
solution to the border dispute in Abyei: a condominium arrangement between
Sudan and South Sudan. Condominium arrangements exist "when two or more
states exercise joint sovereignty over a territory."' Condominia have been used
to resolve border disputes as early as the thirteenth century BC' and have been
adapted to several unique geopolitical models." Although condominia fell into
disfavor following shifts in international legal and political thought after the
3

See generally Douglas H. Johnson, The Root Causes ofSudan's Civil Wars (Indiana 2003).

4

See generally Dorina Bekoe, Kelly Campbell, and Nicholas Howenstein, Resolving the Bounday
2005),
online at
Oct
Inst of Peace
Dispute in Sudan's Alyei Region (US
http://www.usip.org/publications/resolving-boundary-dispute-sudans-abyei-region (visited Apr
1,2012).

5

See, for example, Tim Flatman, Abyei: Predictingthe Future (Sudan Tribune May 9, 2011), online at
http://www.sudantribune.com/Abyei-Predicting-the-future,38887 (visited Apr 1, 2012).
Sudan: Further Violence in Al~yei Border Region (BBC May 20, 2011), online at
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13475434 (visited Apr 1, 20t2).

6
7

Id.

8

Joel H. Samuels, Condominium Arrangements in InternationalPractice: Reviving an Abandoned Concept of
Boundary Dispute Resolution, 29 Mich J Intl L 727, 728 (2008).

9

See George Liska, ImperialAmerica:The InternationalPolitics ofPrimacy 13-14 (Johns Hopkins 1967).

10

Samuels, 29 Mich J Intl L at 733-37 (cited in note 8).
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conclusion of the Second World War, recent proposed condominia" as well as
support from the academy 2 suggest a resurgence in the consideration of
condominia as a viable solution to modern border disputes. This solution was
previously impracticable for the Abyei dispute, given the disparity in power
between the two parties involved. However, the successful independence
referendum of 2011 enables new consideration of the condominium solution.
This Comment will proceed by explaining the history of the dispute in Abyei,
exploring the weaknesses of proposed solutions presently under consideration
by the parties, and finally outlining the benefits and application of a
condominium solution between North Sudan and South Sudan.
II. HISTORY OF DISPUTE IN ABYEI
A. General Background
Abyei is an area of land of over four thousand square miles lying on the
present-day border of the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan.
The exact borders of Abyei are currently disputed by parties claiming rights to
the region, though the 2004 Protocol between the Government of Sudan and
the Sudan People's Liberation Army on the Resolution of Abyei Conflict
defined the territory as "the area of the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms transferred
to Kordofan in 1905.""
Despite the imprecise geography of Abyei, it nonetheless remains a
prominent symbol of cultural divide among the Sudanese. Indeed, as the CPA
notes, "Abyei is a bridge between the north and the south, linking the people of
Sudan." 4 Unsurprisingly, the geographic and cultural importance of Abyei is
accompanied by multiple claims of legal right to the region. The conflict over
competing claims to Abyei by the Ngok Dinka and Misseriya people poses the
greatest threat to peace and stability. Early disputes in the region emerged as
each group sought greater protections of their land rights in Abyei. The Ngok
Dinka, an agro-pastoralist people closely related to the Dinka tribe which
populated southern Sudan, claimed rights as residents of Abyei, while the
Misseriya, a nomadic tribe residing just north of Abyei but who passed through
Abyei each year in order to graze animals, claimed equal rights as residents."s
Initially, under the Anglo-Egyptian condominium in Sudan, the Ngok Dinka
11

12
13
14
's

See, for example, Peter C. Farrand, Comment, Lessons from Briko: Necessay Components for Future
Internationaly Supervired Territories, 15 Emory Intl L Rev 529, 533 (2001); David Scrivener, The
Border Dispute in the Barents Sea, 4]ane's Intelligence Rev 252, 253 (1992).
See, for example, Samuels, 29 Mich J Intl L at 728-32 (cited in note 8).

CPA at Ch IV, § 1.1.2 (cited in note 2).
CPA at Ch IV, § 1.1.1 (cited in note 2).
See generally Bekoe, Campbell, and Howenstein, Resoling the Bounday Dispute in Sudan's Alyei
Region (cited in note 4).
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were principally located in Bahr el Ghazal, a district immediately south of Abyei,
while the Misseriya were principally located in Kordofan, a district immediately
north of Abyei." In 1905, however, administrative concerns prompted Britain to
redistrict the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms into Kordofan in order to establish
17
common administration over the two groups.
Following the 1946 consolidation of the Sudanese condominium into a
single administrative state and the 1953 independence of Sudan from the
condominium, violence erupted between northern and southern Sudan,
crippling intrastate cooperation and exacerbating conflict in Abyei. The violence
resulting from both the First (1955-72) and Second (1983-2005) Sudanese Civil
Wars caused numerous deaths in and closely proximate to Abyei and further
divided the Ngok Dinka and Misseriya as each allied with opposing sides."
Shortly after the outbreak of the First Civil War, the Ngok Dinka allied with
southern Anyana rebels, while the Misseriya favored the north and were
supported by the Khartoum-based government of the Republic of Sudan."
While conflict between the two groups in Abyei had heretofore existed as an
extension of broader northern-southern conflict within Sudan, the War
cemented the direct opposition of the two groups and set Abyei as a central
battleground. The War succeeded in polarizing regional division to the point of
extreme violence. For example, in 1965, seventy-two unarmed Ngok Dinka were
burned alive by a Misseriya mob in South Kordofan just north of Abyei.20
The struggle in Abyei continued during the Second Sudanese Civil War,
deepening the division between the Ngok Dinka and Misseriya in the region.
Regional alliances were maintained from the previous war, so there was little lag
time between the outbreak of the War and regional battles between warring
factions.2 1 In fact, the Ngok Dinka were among several early groups to join the
rebellion and many consequently rose to prominent leadership positions within
the South's governing body: the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA).22
Meanwhile, the Misseriya joined the government-backed northern armies, often

16

The Government of Sudan v The Sudan People'sLiberation Movement/Army, Final Award of July 22, 2009,
35-37 (Perm Ct Arb 2009) (Sudan v SPLM/A).

17

18

South Sudan Presidentto Assert Ayei Belongs to Dinka Ngok (Sudan Tribune Jul 24, 2011), online at
http://www.sudantribune.com/South-Sudan-President-asserts,39616 (visited Apr 17, 2012) .
Sudan: Breaking the Abyei Deadlock **2-3 (Intl Crisis Group Oct 12, 2007), online at
http://www.crisisgroup.org/-/media/Files/africa/horn-of-africa/sudan/B47%2Sudan/
20Breaking%20the%20Abyei%20Deadlock.ashx (visited Apr 1, 2012).

19

Sudan v SPLM/A at 37.

20

Sudan: Breaking the Abyei Deadlock at *2 (cited in note 18).

21

Id.

22

Id.
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serving as murableen-mounted raiders scouting and raiding southern villages. 23
By the conclusion of the Second Civil War in 2005, the landscape of Abyei had
changed dramatically. In addition to the great number of deaths suffered on
both sides, countless villages were displaced from the region. Despite this, the
Abyei issue remained unsettled at the War's conclusion and prospects for
peaceful settlement remained distant.
B. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)
In January of 2005 the government of the Republic of Sudan and the
Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) signed a collection of
agreements that comprised the CPA, thus ending the civil war and enabling
negotiation on the remaining issues between northern and southern Sudan. 24
The CPA is a collection of protocols signed by northern and southern Sudan
including agreements on: broad principles of government and governance,25
modalities of government administration,26 the division of state assets and
liabilities,27 the power of state military force and the reintegration of northern
and southern military units,28 and the interim administrative control of Abyei.29
The collection of agreements represents several years of negotiations aiming to
establish a coherent countrywide democratic governance and agreement over
national distribution of natural resources. Moreover, the Machakos Protocol
establishes a timeline for a South Sudanese independence referendum.30 The
initial agreement in the Machakos Protocol used the 1956 independence
boundaries to demarcate North and South Sudan, leaving Abyei, the Nuba
Mountains, and Blue Nile (collectively the "Three Areas") within North Sudan's
boundaries,31 thereby preserving the dispute over legal rights to Abyei.
In the two years between the signing of the Machakos Protocol and the
signing of the Protocol on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Abyei Area, the
Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A negotiated the issue of whether to
include Abyei in the independence referendum. The eventual agreement within
the Protocol on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Abyei Area, arrived at with

23
24

Brenda K. Uekert, Rivers of Blood: A Comparative Study of Government Massacres 90 (Praeger
1995).
See generally CPA (cited in note 2).

25

Id at Ch I (Machakos Protocol).

26

Id at Ch II.

27

Id at Ch III.

28

CPA at Ch VI (cited in note 2).
Id at Ch IV (Protocol on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Abyei Area).
Machakos Protocol, § 2.5 (cited in note 25).

29
30
31

UNDP in ProtocolAreas(UN Development Programme 2011), online at http://www.sd.undp.org/
UNDPprotocolareas.htm (visited Apr 1, 2012).
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the encouragement of third-party state actors, was a compromise providing for
an additional referendum for residents of Abyei to choose whether or not to
secede with the South should the South elect to do so in the Machakos
referendum. The Abyei referendum states:
Simultaneously with the referendum for southern Sudan, the residents of
Abyei will cast a separate ballot. The proposition voted on in the separate
ballot will present the residents of Abyei with the following choices,
irrespective of the results of the southern referendum:
(a) That Abyei retain its special administrative status in the north;
(b) That Abyei be part of Bahr el Ghazal. 32
As the referendum implies, the Protocol on the Resolution of the Conflict in the
Abyei Area provides for a special administrative status for Abyei in the interim
period before the referendum. This special administrative status provides the
structure of local government and divides oil revenues within Abyei, creating an
interim system of local government partly dependent on support from the
national government and international monitors.33 It provides that residents of
Abyei will be citizens of both Western Kordofan and Bahr el Ghazal with
representation in both legislatures,3 4 Abyei will be administered by a local council
elected by Abyei residents,35 oil revenues will be divided six ways between the
northern and southern governments, the two local districts, and the Ngok Dinka
and Misseriya in particular,3 6 and the region will be given support by national
Like the referendum
development projects and international monitors.
special
administrative status
provision discussed above, the details of the
governing Abyei in the interim depend on an understanding of who qualifies as a
resident of Abyei, an issue which itself depends on defining regional borders.
In the years following the signing of the CPA, disagreement over the
boundaries of Abyei renewed hostilities and crippled both the special
administrative status governing Abyei and the looming referendum. The Abyei
Protocol provides for an Abyei Boundaries Commission to "define and
demarcate the area of the nine Ngok Dinka Chiefdoms."" Anticipation of the
upcoming referendum spurred early concerns regarding Abyei residency status.
The issue was complicated by the nomadic nature of the Misseriya, and northern
loyalists argued that exclusion of Misseriya voters in the referendum could

32

Protocol on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Abyei Area,

33

Id at

34
3s

Id at
Id at

36

Protocol on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Abyei Area,

37

Id at

38

id at § 5.1.

§

1.3 (cited in note 29).

§ 1.2.
1.2.1.
1.2.2.

§§

1.2.4-5.
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unjustifiably guarantee that Abyei would vote to join Bhar el Ghazal.39 The CPA
provides little guidance on the issue; nowhere in the text of the protocols are the
Misseriya defined as residents of Abyei. Instead, Chapter IV notes only: "The
Misseriya and other nomadic peoples retain their traditional rights to graze cattle
and move across the territory of Abyei."40 Ambiguity over residency status
renewed historic ambiguity over the boundary lines of Abyei itself. In response,
the Abyei Boundaries Commission prepared a report defining Abyei's
boundaries in hopes that filling this remaining gap in the agreement would
facilitate the eventual referendum.41
The Boundaries Commission, composed of five members representing
North Sudan, five members representing the SPLM/A, and five international
experts, 42 was chre
charged with investigating historical materials and listening to
presentations from each party and local residents in preparation for presenting a
report to the Presidency before the end of the pre-interim period. 3 In the Rules
of Procedure of the Boundaries Commission the parties agreed that "[t]he
Commission will endeavor to reach a decision by consensus. If, however, an
agreed position by the two sides is not achieved, the experts will have the final
say." 4 4 Moreover, the Abyei Appendix to the CPA notes that the report
presented to the Presidency-if arrived at by the Rules of Procedure-"shall be
final and binding on the parties."45 The Boundaries Commission considered a
range of historical maps and heard separate arguments regarding boundaries
from the Government of Sudan, the Misseriya, and a joint argument from the
SPLM/A and the Ngok Dinka. 46 However, despite the information available and
both parties' ostensible agreement to be bound by the Commission's report, the
Presidency rejected it, citing a failure of the Commission to establish the
boundaries as they existed in 1905.47 This rejection by the Commission radically
increased hostilities in Abyei, causing both the Misseriya tribesmen and the

39

See, for example, Rebecca Hamilton, How a Resideng Dispute in One Key Town CouldLead Sudan Back
to War, (Christian Sci Monitor Nov 2, 2010) online at http://www.csmonitor.com/
World/Africa/2010/1102/How-a-residency-dispute-in-one-key-town-could-lead-Sudan-back-towar (visited Apr 3, 2012).

40

Protocol on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Abyei Area, § 1.1.3 (cited in note 29).
See, for example, Line Drawn:A Border Dispute in Southern Sudan is Resolved (The Economist July 23,
2009), online at http://www.economist.com/node/14070450 (visited Apr 1, 2012).
Abyei Boundaries Commission Report: Part2: Appendices, Appendix 1.2, 1 2 (Abyei Boundaries Commn

41

42

Jul 14, 2005).
43

Id at Appendix 1.2, TT 3-5.

44

Id at Appendix 1.4,

14.

45

Id at Appendix 1.2,

5.

46

Douglas H. Johnson, The Abyei Protocol Demystified (Sudan Tribune Dec 10, 2007), online at
http://www.sudantribune.com/The-Abyei-Protocol-Demystified,25125 (visited Apr 1, 2012).

47

Id.
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SPLM/A to deploy troops to the region, resulting in dozens of deaths and
displacing tens of thousands of local residents.48
Given the renewed violence in the region and the bleak record of past
cooperation, both parties to the conflict agreed to refer the boundary dispute to
the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) at The Hague. Referring the dispute
to international arbitration had the benefit of removing the hostility and
ingrained bias, however, as with the Abyei Boundaries Commission, the
possibility of rejection by the parties remained significant. Similar to the
Commission, the PCA's award was technically binding: "The Award, duly
pronounced and notified to the agents of the parties, settles the dispute
definitively and without appeal." 4 9 The 1907 Convention establishing the PCA
also notes, "[submitting a dispute to PCA arbitration] implies an engagement to
submit in good faith to the Award."o However, the Court has no actual
enforcement power but merely relies on the moral authority of the signatory
powers and collective acceptance of the international community.
On July 22, 2009, the PCA rendered its decision regarding the Abyei
border dispute, ordering the redrawing of Abyei's northern, eastern, and western
borders." The PCA award shrunk the area of Abyei considerably relative to that
defined by the Boundaries Commission, though the PCA defined area remained
larger than the boundaries argued for by the Government of Sudan.5 2 Although
both the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A announced that they would
accept the PCA's ruling, developments following the award have demonstrated
the opposite. Indeed, days after the decision the deputy head of the SPLM/A
bloc in the Sudanese Parliament qualified the award, stating that the PCA's
ruling did not decide if Abyei regional oilfields are part of North or South
Sudan.53 Moreover, recent proposed solutions to the Abyei conflict suggest the
boundaries as awarded are, at the very least, negotiable.54

48

Amber

49
50

Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, Ch III, Art 81, 36 Star
2199, Treaty Ser No 536 (1907) (1907 Convention).
Id at Ch I, Art 37.

51

See generally Sudan v SPLM/A.

52

Salman M.A. Salman, The Abyei Dispute between Northern and Southern Sudan and the Decision of the
Permanent Court of Arbitration (World Bank July 2010), online at http://go.worldbank.org/
M0SRDKU7H0 (visited Apr 1, 2012).

s3

Sudan's SPLM Threatens to Refer OilieldDispute to The Hague (Sudan Tribune July 26, 2009), online at
http://www.sudantribune.com/Sudan-s-SPLM-threatens-to-refer,31945 (visited Apr 1, 2012).

54

See, for example, Sudan Rules OutAbyei Swap Deal with South (Sudan Tribune Oct 30, 2011), online
at http://www.sudantribune.com/Sudan-rules-out-Abyei-swap-deal,40585 (visited Apr 1, 2012);
Thirik Mijak, Is SPLM Buying Abyei and Selling Heghg to North Sudan Regime? (Gurtong Nov 22,
2011), online at http://www.gurtong.net/ECM/Editorial/tabid/124/cd/ArticleView/mid/

Henshaw, Sudan Tinderbox Catches Fire (BBC May 24,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7418582.stm (visited Apr 17, 2012).
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C. Recent Violence, the Temporary Agreement, and the 2011
Referendum
In January 2011, South Sudan held the independence referendum
authorized by the CPA." According to the South Sudan Referendum
Commission, the body charged with overseeing the independence referendum,
"98.8% voted for secession."" Shortly after the referendum, Sudanese President
Omer Hassan Al-Bashir accepted the referendum result.17 The result was
likewise accepted by the UN, the EU, the US and others." Although the vote
passed in January, independence was not set to occur until the following July."
Despite the successful execution of the independence referendum, the
Abyei referendum also provided for in the CPA never occurred. Disputes
between the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A over Abyei's borders and
residency status for local Misseriya sunk any possibility of conducting the vote
along with the independence referendum. Although the failure of the Abyei
referendum was acknowledged far before the vote was to take place, hostilities
and uncertainty within and regarding Abyei pervaded intrastate politics following
the independence referendum.o Despite the success of South Sudan's
independence, Abyei remained a significant obstacle to lasting peace between the
newly drawn states.
Tensions over Abyei sparked violence shortly after South Sudan's
independence, necessitating further temporary agreements between Sudan and
South Sudan regarding the governance of the unstable region. From May 20 to
May 21, 2011, forces from North Sudan invaded Abyei, displacing an estimated
one hundred thousand people." Following the May violence, the Government
of Sudan and the SPLM/A reached a temporary agreement on Abyei in June of
2011. The parties agreed as follows:

519/articleld/6072/Is-SPLM-Buying-Abyei-and-Selling-Heglig-to-North-Sudan-Regime.aspx
(visited Apr 1, 2012).
55

56

See, for example, South Sudan Independence Referendum 'Credible,' Say EU Monitors (The Guardian Jan
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jan/1 7/southern-sudan2011),
online
at
17,
independence-referendum (visited Apr 1, 2012).
Ted Dagne, The Republic of South Sudan: Opportunities and Challenges for Africa's Newest Country 1
(Cong Rsrch Ser Jul 25, 2011).

57

See PresidentBashir Oficialy Endorses South Sudan Independence (Sudan Tribune Feb 7, 2011), online at
http://wvw.sudantribune.com/South-Sudan-officially-voted,37905 (visited Apr 1, 2012).

58

Id.

s9

Id.
See, for example, Muhyadin Ahmed Roble, Sudan: Abyei Referendum Deadkne Impossibk (Africa
News Oct 15, 2010), online at http://www.africanews.com/site/SudanAbyei_referendum
deadlinejimpossible/1ist-messages/35375 (visited Apr 1, 2012).

60

61

Dagne, The Republic ofSouth Sudan at 3-4 (cited in note 56).
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The Abyei Area Administration shall consist of a Chief Administrator, a
Deputy Chief Administrator and five heads of department.
The Chief Administrator shall be a nominee of SPLM, agreed by the
Government of the Sudan. The Deputy Chief Administrator shall be a
nominee of the Government of the Sudan, agreed by SPLM....
There shall be established an Abyei Joint Oversight Committee which shall
be composed of four members. Each Party shall appoint two members to
the Oversight Committee.

...

19. The Abyei Area Executive Council shall draw up budget for review
and approval by the Abyei Area Council. The Government of the Sudan
and the Government of Southern Sudan shall jointly finance that budget.
20. With the exception of ISFA [Interim Ethiopian peacekeeping forces],
the Abyei Area shall be demilitarized. Any [Sudanese or South Sudanese]
forces shall redeploy out of the Area. Henceforth, all other forces, apart
from the ISFA, shall remain outside the boundaries of Abyei Area, as
defined by the Permanent Court of Arbitration. ...
22. A Joint Military Observer Committee, consisting of an equal number
of observers from the two Parties shall be stationed in Abyei.....
36. All displaced former residents of Abyei have the right to return to
their former places of residence. The Parties shall facilitate the rapid return
of internally displaced persons....
39. Consistent with the Abyei Protocol, pastoral nomads shall enjoy rights
of migration and access to pasture and water in accordance with traditional
migration routes in the Abyei Area....
This Agreement and the Abyei Protocol (except as modified by the terms
herein) shall continue to apply until such time as the final status of Abyei
has been resolved. 62
With the Temporary Agreement in effect governing Abyei, The Republic of
South Sudan officially became independent on July 9, 201 1.63
III. THE CONDOMINIUM SOLUTION

A. Weaknesses of Other Proposed Solutions
Since the failed Abyei referendum, several proposals regarding the future
of Abyei have been raised. None, however, satisfy the criteria for a desirable

solution. The history of failed solutions in Abyei suggests two correlated factors
by which to assess potential solutions: the viability of the proposed solution and
proper representation of each party's interests. Historically, solutions to the
Abyei conflict have typically failed to meet either or both of these criteria,
resulting in proposals that are impractical, unjust, or both. However, previous
62

Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Sudan and the Sudan People's
Liberation Movement on Temporary Arrangements for the Administration and Security of the
Abyei Area, UN Doc No S/2011/384 (2011).

63

Dagne, The Republic of South Sudan at 1 (cited in note 56).
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proposed solutions applied to a border dispute between a state and a non-state
actor. Since the independence of South Sudan has manifested southern interests
in a state actor, the framework has changed. Therefore, it is worthwhile to
address a few of the most prominent proposals currently on the table in Abyei.
The most obvious solution remains the Abyei referendum as outlined by
the CPA. Although this solution benefits from legitimacy accorded by its
historical basis in the CPA, it no longer exists as a viable solution given recent
developments in Abyei. Many of the forces working against the Abyei
referendum before persist. The principal obstacle for this referendum was, and
remains, the parties' failure to cooperate in demarcating borders on the land
according to the PCA award and the corresponding uncertainty regarding voter
status for Misseriya in the region.64 The prospects of curing these two obstacles
are dim, as both issues remain critical for both states.
The determination of voter status for regional Misseriya could prove
decisive in the referendum, creating a situation in which a compromise by one
party could prove fatal to its interests. In the months before the envisioned
referendum, sources reported increased Misseriya settlement in Abyei,
prompting concerns over alleged manipulation of the vote: "[Chief
Administrator of Abyei] Arop believes that the [Misseriya] settlements are aimed
at changing the demographic make-up of Abyei, signaling early preparations for
manipulation of the vote."" Moreover, public commentary has essentially
foreclosed the possibility of a referendum. Sudanese president Omer Al-Bashir
has cemented North Sudan's hardline position, stating that the referendum will
only take place "if all the people of Abyei participate, not just the Ngok
Dinka."66
A second proposed solution that has surfaced in reports of negotiations
between the two Sudanese states is a bilateral agreement in which one party
cedes rights to a part or all of Abyei in exchange for capital resources. The logic
is, on its face, appealing: if the people of Abyei are blocked from voting on the
future alignment of the region, the two parent states can negotiate an agreement.
Months after the independence of South Sudan, its leaders offered a deal to
North Sudan in which it would essentially purchase territorial sovereignty in
Abyei in exchange for "[the sale of] oil at a discounted price, an unspecified

64
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66

See, for example, Muhammad Osman, North-South Talks over Abyei Referendum Fail,New Round
Scheduled (Sudan Tribune Oct 12, 2010), online at http://www.sudantribune.com/North-Southtalks-over-Abyei,36576 (visited Apr 1, 2012).
Amanda Hsiao, Sudan Official: Misseriya Settling in Abyei, Fueling Referendum Tensions (Enough Project
Aug 4, 2010), online at http://www.enoughproject.org/blogs/sudan-official-misseriya-settlingabyei-fueling-referendum-tensions (visited Apr 1, 2012).
No Referendum in Abyei, Sudanese Ofidal Says (Sudan Tribune Dec 9, 2010), online at
http://www.sudantribune.com/No-referendum-in-Abyei-Sudanese,37221 (visited Apr 1, 2012).
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amount of cash, and forgiveness of all arrears from oil sharing claimed by the
South from the time before it gained independence last July."67
However, like the Abyei referendum, such a solution has little chance of
gaining traction among the entrenched parties. Importantly, the proposed deals
generally take the form of the transfer of Abyei along with the cessation of 'any
claims on areas on the border of Southern Sudan that (North Sudan] is
claiming."m6 Framing the deal as a cessation of claims implies that neither South
Sudan nor North Sudan currently has full rights to the region, a statement
neither state is willing to make publicly, nor one that garners popular support. In
fact, the mere purchase proposal by South Sudan generated backlash from
southern Ngok Dinka who criticized the proposition that the area to which they
claim a right must be acquired at all.6 ' Resistance from North Sudan has been
formalized at the state level; a spokesman from the ruling party in North Sudan
responded to the proPosal: "Abyei belongs to the north and that it is not up for
sale or compromise." 0
Even if a negotiation were somehow achieved, governing the resulting
region would be problematic. Unequal representation will necessarily result for
either the Ngok Dinka or the Misseriya. Because both parties lay claim to rights
in Abyei and have aligned directly with one state, eventual unilateral control of
the region will necessarily work to the detriment of one of the two groups.
Although the concern over exploitation and abuse of the non-represented group
is currently only hypothetical, the history of violence in the region both in
wartime and peace suggests a significant concern for the legal rights of the nonrepresented group. Moreover, recent clashes in Abyei have spurred international
monitors to raise human rights concerns about Abyei 7 extending unilateral
control seems unlikely to cure such abuses, and may exacerbate them.
Given the concerns raised by each of the above proposed solutions, it is
clear that the options currently under consideration present a bleak picture of
the future for Abyei. Given the numerous issues resulting from the current
interim agreement, maintenance of the status quo is neither productive nor
desirable, while proposed solutions recycled from the early independence of
Sudan from the Anglo-Egyptian condominium in the twentieth century merely
67

Sudan Rules OutAlei Swap Deal wth South (cited in note 54).
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Id (quoting Pagan Amum, secretary general of the SPLM/A).
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See, for example, Mijak, Is SPLM Buying Alyei and Selling Heglg to North Sudan Regime? (cited in
note 54); Mark Otwari Odufa, Why 'DollarsForAbyei"May Backfire (Gurtong Dec 2,2011), online
at
http://www.gurtong.net/ECM/Editorial/tabid/124/cd/ArticleView/mid/519/articleld/
6119/Why-Dollars-For-Abyei-May-Backfire.aspx (visited Apr 1, 2012).
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See, for example, UN Official UrgesHuman Rights Probe in Abyei, South Kordofan (Sudan Tribune June
27, 2011), online at http://www.sudantribune.com/UN-official-urges-human-rights,39360
(visited Apr 1, 2012).
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replace one evil with another. However, the recent independence of South
Sudan enables fresh consideration of alternatives, the most promising of which
is a condominium arrangement between North and South Sudan.
B. Introduction to Condominium Arrangements
The joint exercise of sovereignty in a region by two states under a
condominium arrangement has been used to resolve border disputes around the
world as early as the thirteenth century BC.7 2 In fact, this compromise solution
has been used in a wide variety of border disputes, including water condominia,"
colonial condominia (governing land non-contiguous to either sovereign),74
frontier condominia (governing land contiguous to both sovereigns)," and
hybrid condominia (those blending the above types)." Traditionally, condominia
have been discredited as permanent solutions and have been used instead as
"measures of last resort when efforts to resolve territorial disputes through
negotiation have failed."
The rare use of condominia is a product of skepticism regarding the
workability of such agreements78 and the associated pessimism of international
scholars favoring indivisible notions of sovereignty.79 Such attacks on
condominia in the abstract are based on concerns of administrative practicality
or abstract characterization, not criticisms based on any substantive legal
doctrine. Therefore, while a proposed condominium may be challenged on
grounds that it is logistically difficult or improperly labeled, there is no present
concern that such an agreement is invalid or unrecognizable under international
law. Moreover, at least one legal scholar has challenged the definitional criticism
of condominia by arguing for a reframing of such agreements from the state

72

See Liska, Imperia/America:The InternationalPolitics of Primay 13-14 (cited in note 9).

73

See, for example, Land, Island and Maritime FrontierDispute (El Sal v Hond: Nicar intervening), 1992

ICJ 351, 600 (Sept 11, 1992).
74

See, for example, D.P. O'Connell, The Condominium of the New Hebrides,43 Brit YB Intl L 71, 75-76
(1968-69).
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See, for example, Peter Schneider, Condominium, in Rudolf Bernhardt, ed, 1 Engclopedia of Public
InternationalLaw732, 732 (Elsevier Science 1992).
See, for example, P.M. Holt and M.W. Daly, The HistoU of the Sudan: From the Coming of Islam to the
PresentDay 118 (Weidenfeld & Nicholson 3d ed 1979).
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Samuels, 29 Mich J Intl L at 728 (cited in note 8).
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Id, citing Hersch Lauterpacht, ed, 1 InternationalLaw: Being the Collected Papers of Hersch Lauterpacht
370, 371-72 (Cambridge 1970) (suggesting a condominium "may be practicable only between
States between which there exists an atmosphere of understanding or co-operation-in which
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See, for example, Giovanni Distefano, Theories on TerritoialSovereagnty:AReappraisal,41 J Sharia &
Law 25, 32 (2010) (implicitly challenging the notion of joint sovereignty by defining sovereignty as
an 'exclusive power of government").
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level to the international community level.so With this understanding, a
condominium agreement should be understood as establishing a territory
respecting the exercise of competences of a partial international community,
rather than a territory under the governance of two jointly sovereign states.
This work to clarify the nature of a condominium is only helpful, for purposes
of this Comment, insofar as it acknowledges that challenges to condominium
agreements in the abstract are extralegal challenges. This opinion has been
supported by other scholars, including Joel Samuels, a legal scholar and advocate
for greater consideration of condominia, who notes: "[T]here is nothing in legal
theory ... to render impossible a permanent and aV2eed division of sovereignty
as suggested by the very nature of a condominium."
Despite the contemporary rarity of international condominium
arrangements, several condominia have been proposed in the past half century.
As Samuels notes, condominia have been considered for some of the most
prominent territorial disputes in recent international history,8 3 including
Gibraltar,8 4 Brako," the West Bank and Gaza," the Caspian Sea, and the
Barents Sea". The wide application of condominium proposals highlights the
absence of any such proposal in Abyei and urges its consideration. Nonetheless,
critics remain skeptical that a bilateral governance mechanism can succeed
between two parties who have otherwise been unable to agree on an alternative
solution.
C. Tenets for a Strong Condominium
The construction of a successful condominium arrangement should take
careful consideration of the potential pitfalls presented by the exercise of joint
sovereignty, demonstrated by both historical failures of interstate condominia
and more abstract principles of the legal structure of common property
ownership. While historical accounts of condominia are instructive insofar as
80
81

82
83

See generally Samuels, 29 Mich J Ind L 727 (cited in note 8).
Vincent P. Bantz, The InternationalLegal Status of Condominia, 12 Fla J Intl L 77, 99 (1998).
Samuels, 29 Mich J Intl L at 728 (cited in note 8), citing Lauterpacht, ed, InternationalLaw at 371
(cited in note 78).
For a discussion of the historical development and recent application of condominium
agreements, see generally Samuels, 29 Mich J Intl L 727 (cited in note 8).

84

See, for example, Britain and Spain Pledge to Continue Talks on Gibraltar,Glasgow Herald 4 (Dec 7,
1985).

85

See, for example, Farrand, 15 Emory Intl L Rev at 533 (cited in note 11).
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See, for example, Dore Gold, From Polarity to Unity: World Leaders' Eyes on Us, Jerusalem Post 8
(Nov 10, 1995).

87

See, for example, Michael Bronner, Oil Economist Says Sanctions Hurt U.S. Firms, Wash Times A8
(Nov 22, 1997).
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See, for example, Scrivener, 4 Jane's Intelligence Rev at 252, 253 (cited in note 11).
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they reveal consequences of specific condominium design, an understanding of
common property design informs the broader development of condominia,
given the overlap of issues between private and public joint exercise of power.
Although scholars disagree over the degree to which condominia and private
common ownership may be analogized, such disagreements center on the
proper characterization of condominia, rather than on the proper role of using
insights from private common property regimes in applying condominium
theory to a specific border dispute."
Once the condominium arrangement is in development, parties should
consider, and seek to implement, principles of common property. Samuels refers
to Elinor Ostrom's analysis in Governing the Commons, in which she identified and
analyzed successful common property regimes "in which (1) appropriators have
devised, applied, and monitored their own rules to control the use of [common
pool resources] and (2) the resource systems, as well as the institutions, have
survived for long periods of time."" Ostrom's work proceeds to outline eight
design principles for common property regimes that Samuels argues might prove
instructive for the common governance of a region under a condominium.
Those principles are: "(1) clearly defined boundaries; (2) congruence between
the rules for appropriation and local conditions; (3) collective-choice
arrangements; (4) monitoring systems; (5) graduated sanctions; (6) conflictresolution mechanisms; (7) minimal recognition of rights to organize; and (8)
multi-tiered, nested enterprises.""
While private common property arrangements provide a useful starting
position for the theoretical construction of a successful international
condominium arrangement, it is important to recognize differences between the
two systems that may alter the understanding of proper construction, including
the principal role of public actors, collection and distribution of public
resources, and the need for regional protection. Analyses of past international
condominium arrangements are instructive on these matters.
Combining Ostrom's baseline design principles with lessons learned from
historical condominia allows for the construction of a strong theoretical model
for a successful condominia against which to compare this Comment's model
for an Abyei condominium. To that end, Samuels's article is highly instructive, as
he analyzes the numerous historical condominia he outlined in order to glean
89

90

91

See generally Samuels, 29 Mich J Intl L 727 (cited in note 8) (discussing the parallel concerns of
private common-property design and condominium design). But see Bantz, 12 Fla J Intl L 77
(cited in note 81) (noting the imperfect analogy between public condominia and private commonproperty regimes).
Samuels, 29 Mich J Intl L at 770 (cited in note 8), citing Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The
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useful principles. He specifically identifies (1) the importance of transparency in
lawmaking from the Moresnet condominium;92 (2) rights of supervision by
respective parties from the Hittite condominium; 3 (3) the use of joint
implementation of governing laws to encourage cooperative monitoring and
enforcement from the New Hebrides condominium; 94 (4) the controlled
devolution of local authority to ensure justice and administrative ease from the
Trieste condominium;5 (5) the importance of condominium partners as "coequals in authority, with equal rights and obligations" from both the Trieste and
Sudanese condominiums;96 and (6) the overarching importance of an incentive
structure that keeps each condominium partner invested in maintaining the
condominium. 7 Because applying a condominium agreement to a specific
border dispute is necessarily sui generis, legal doctrine can only go so far in
aiding the development of a practical condominium solution. Therefore, using
both resources-common property theory and assessment of historical
condominia-creates a workable set of principles to guide the application of a
condominium approach to Abyei where legal doctrine cannot.
D. The Benefits of a Condominium Approach to Abyei
Before addressing the application of the condominium approach to Abyei,
it is important to outline the merits of suggesting such a solution in the first
place. Consider the two factors used above to criticize other proposed solutions:
the viability of the proposed solution and the proper representation of each
party's interests. An analysis of each factor suggests that a condominium is welltailored to the border dispute in Abyei.9' A condominium approach is more
viable than the alternatives on the table because it avoids the issue of unilateral
loss that plagues the others. Given the violent history in Abyei and the deeply
ingrained positions of both the states and the Ngok Dinka and Misseriya, a
diplomatic solution resulting in unilateral control of Abyei is unlikely. Therefore,
a solution that allows both parties to retain rights is inherently more viable in
Abyei. Additionally, the condominium solution benefits from its novelty.
Whereas some solutions have been put to the test and failed," and others have
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Samuels, 29 MichJ Intl L at 772 (cited in note 8).
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been proposed and swiftly rejected before implementation, 00 the condominium
approach would provide a solution outside of the scope of historical failures and
leverage the recent independence of South Sudan into a more viable option.
Moreover, the current administrative regime in place in Abyei closely
resembles a condominium agreement, providing institutional momentum toward
a long-term condominium arrangement. The Temporary Agreement reached by
the parties in June 2011 and currently in place in Abyei is governed under an
administration of joint sovereignty between North and South Sudan.o'0 The
fundamental framework of the Temporary Agreement, then, is a condominium
agreement. However, the Agreement includes provisions for third-party military
presence, 10 2 international facilitators, 0 3 and provisions ensuring the parties'
cooperation in developing a long-term solution beyond the Temporary
Agreement. 1 04 But while the Temporary Agreement provides institutional
momentum toward the development of a condominium agreement, it is itself
insufficient to ensure lasting peace in Abyei. Failure of the parties to comply
with the terms of the Agreemento and its inherently temporary nature both
necessitate the implementation of a more robust, well-devised joint sovereignty
agreement.
IV. APPLYING THE CONDOMINIUM APPROACH TO ABYEI
A successful condominium must accommodate the specific characteristics
unique to the border dispute it seeks to cure; thus, a condominium in Abyei
must be designed for the mutual satisfaction of North Sudan and South Sudan
with respect to border demarcation, citizenship rights, the distribution of
resources, the distribution of administrative duties, and the protection of area
residents. More generally, a condominium in Abyei must be structured so as to

100

See, for example, Sudan Rules out Abyei Swap Deal with South (cited in note 54).

101 See generally Temporay Arrangementsfor the Administrationand Securny' of the Abyei Area (cited in note
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The Government of Sudan has rejected mandates to redeploy its troops from Abyei in line with
the June agreement. See, for example, SPLM's Luka Biong Rejects Conditional Withdrawalof Troops
from Abyei (Sudan Tribune Oct 4, 2011), online at http://www.sudantribune.com/SPLM-s-LukaBiong-rejects,40321 (visited Apr 1, 2012); Laura Heaton and Amanda Hsiao, Abyei Remains Tense
As UN, Sudanese Army Disagree on Troop Presence (Christian Sci Monitor July 26, 2011), online at
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minimize the difficulties associated with "frontier condominiums"' 0 6 and
condominia governing regions of past inter-party violence. Fortunately, the
history of dealings between North and South Sudan (including the pre-state
southern Sudan region) provides a solid foundation from which a robust
condominium may be built.
The initial hurdle for the development of a lasting condominium in Abyei
is creating incentives for cooperation in the development of a long-term
solution. As Samuels notes, an "action-forcing event"'o 7 is often instrumental in
initiating the negotiation process. Given the significant degree of foreign aid and
support given to Sudan since its independence" as well as recent international
interest in economic investment in South Sudan,'0 9 the role of international
sanctions or incentives could prove highly influential in initiating and facilitating
negotiation talks. Even without an external "action-forcing event," North and
South Sudan maintain internal incentives to negotiate a long-term agreement.
Both states suffer from interstate violence, both fail to maximize revenues from
state-owned land resources, and both are subject to vocal local groups' calls for a
solution. Therefore, the same forces that worked toward the development of the
Temporary Agreement and the CPA before it can contribute to the development
of a condominium agreement, even absent foreign intervention.
The Temporary Agreement currently governing Abyei (with the aid of
international military support) and the CPA are enormously useful in the
theoretical construction of an Abyei condominium arrangement. Though
significant portions of the CPA have been tacitly rejected and the provisions of
the Temporary Agreement are, by their nature, temporary only, both include
agreements on issues fundamental to constructing an Abyei condominium and
signify points of agreements that may be reproduced or built upon in a
permanent condominium arrangement. Therefore, each of the principal
categories examined below will first reference past agreements reached on the
issue in order to ground realistic expectations between the parties.
A. Border Demarcation
An important benefit of a joint-sovereignty solution to the Abyei dispute is
that it minimizes the importance of border demarcation between the parties.
J Intl L at 735 (cited in note 8) (noting that frontier condominia suffer from
unique obstacles stemming from the contiguous land disputes such as border crossings, currency
flows, and citizenship issues).

106 Samuels, 29 Mich

107

Id at 774.

108 See, for example, The United Nations Serving Sudan for over a Half-Century (UN Development
Programme 2011), online at http://www.sd.undp.org/un_sudan.htm (visited Apr 1, 2012).
1o9 Frederika Whitehead and Claire Provost, South Sudan Set to Showcase its ForeignInvestment Potential
(The
Guardian
Dec
14,
2011),
online
at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/globaldevelopment/201 1/dec/14/south-sudan-foreign-investment-potential (visited Apr 1, 2012).
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Whereas border demarcation was previously the most significant obstacle to a
compromise in Abyei because of the consequences it would have on referendum
voting rights,"o oil resources, and geo-political control,"' joint control of Abyei
removes the referendum concern and allows for the fair distribution of the
commonly held land and resources. Therefore, although border demarcation has
historically proved to be fatal to Abyei negotiations, it is unlikely that the issue
would have the same impact under a condominium approach. The Temporary
Agreement incorporates the PCA's award regarding Abyei's boundaries, 12 and
the proposed condominium solution should adopt the same understanding,
since it is the only recent unbiased adjudication of historical borders. Although
other frontier land condominia have divided the governed area into sub-regional
areas under the control or ownership of one of the parties to the
condominium,"' that solution is inadvisable for Abyei. The claims of the
Misseriya underlying the Abyei dispute are for nomadic grazing rights along
traditional paths throughout Abyei; restricting their ownership to a set boundary
within Abyei would frustrate this original claim. Accordingly, the Temporary
Agreement and the Abyei Protocol both recognize "rights of migration and
access to pasture and water in accordance with traditional migration routes in
the Abyei Area." 4 Therefore, an agreement covering border demarcation within
Abyei would be extraneous and the PCA boundaries between Abyei, Sudan, and
South Sudan would govern.
B. Citizenship Rights
The allocation of citizenship rights under a condominium is most difficult
in frontier condominia, particularly where the area to be governed was formerly
part of either party state, but in Abyei, explicit state allegiance will likely alleviate
the difficulty. Citizenship issues are extremely important because while the
governed region will likely have local representatives to administer local
government (especially if Ostrom's eighth design principle is to be satisfied"'),
local residents will still be subject to state authority of one or both of the parties
to the agreement. Citizenship determination, therefore, directly affects such
broad issues as voting rights and the laws to which residents are subject. The
11

See, for example, Sudan Official Misseriya Settling in Aljei, Fueling Referendum Tensions (cited in note
65).
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See, for example, James Copnall, Sudan: Why Alyei Is Crucial to North and South (BBC News May
23, 2011), online at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13502845 (visited Apr 1, 2012).
Temporay Arrangementsfor the Administration and Security of theAlyeiArea at 2 (cited in note 62).
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See, for example, Samuels, 29 Mich J Ind L at 744 (cited in note 8), citing Convention of Gastein,
Austria-Prussia, Art I, (Aug 14, 1865).
114 Temporary Arrangementsfor the Administraion and Security of theAleiArea at 39 (cited in note 62).
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Samuels, 29 Mich J Ind L at 771 (cited in note 8), citing Ostrom, Governing the Commons at 101-02
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Temporary Agreement is silent on matters of citizenship, while the CPA states
only that, under the special administrative status held before the ill-fated Abyei
referendum, "[r]esidents of Abyei will be citizens of both [northern] Western
Kordofan and [southern] Bahr el Ghazal, with representation in the legislatures
of both states."'t1
Historically, condominia over land have allocated citizenship rights in two
different ways: dividing local residents into citizens of the two member states,' 17
or providing for some modified form of joint citizenship between the member
states."' Though, theoretically, both options might be considered in Abyei, given
the clear division of state allegiance among the Misseriya and Ngok Dinka in
Abyei, divided citizenship seems both more practicable and desirable. The
demographic circumstances present in Abyei bear similarity to the Moresnet
condominium between Prussia and the Netherlands (later Prussia and Belgium
after Belgium's independence from the Netherlands). In Moresnet, the vast
majority of local residents were Prussian or Belgian, and the condominium
agreement allowed the preservation of existing citizenship rights with little
resistance from either side."' The implications of citizenship rights in Abyei
comport with the proposition of a divided citizenry. Inter-Sudanese voting rights
no longer matter as they did under the CPA, and the political as well as cultural
interests of the Misseriya and Ngok Dinka are represented by the Government
of North Sudan and the Government of South Sudan respectively.
C. Executive Authority
The Temporary Agreement incorporates the executive administration
provisions of the CPA in establishing a "Chief Administrator, a Deputy Chief
Administrator and five heads of department."120 Unlike the CPA, however, the
Temporary Agreement specifies the division of the Administrative authority
between North and South Sudan.12 ' Although South Sudan has a greater number

116 Protocol on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Abyei Area at § 1.2.1 (cited in note 29).
117 See, for example, Samuels, 29 Mich J Intl L at 744 (cited in note 8), citing Convention of Gastein,

Austria-Prussia, Art I (cited in note 113).

J Intl L at 742 (cited in note 8), citing Camille Piccioni,
Moresnet, in M.A.F. Frangulis, ed, 2 Dictionnaire Diblomatique 165 (Academie Diplomatique
Internationale 1933).

118 See, for example, Samuels, 29 Mich

J Intl L at 742 (cited in note 8), citing Vienna Congress Treaty, June 9,
1815, reprinted in Edward Hertslet, 1 The Map of Europe by Treaty 208 (Harrison & Sons 1875); M.
Nicolas Politis, Chronique Des Faits Internationaux,11 Revue Generale de Droit International Public
68, 71 (1904).

119 See Samuels, 29 Mich

Temporay Arrangementsfor the Administration and Security of the Abyei Area at 1 4 (cited in note 62);
Protocol on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Abyei Area at § 2.4 (cited in note 29).
121 Temporag Arrangementsfor the Administration and Security of the Abyei Area, 1 5 (cited in note 62)
(specifying that the Chief Administrator and three heads of department would be nominees of the
120
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of executive representatives under the Temporary Agreement, such majority
does not give it the ability to overrule North Sudanese interests because
Executive Council decisions require consensus. 122 Despite the consensus
requirement, dividing the executive authority inequitably between the parties
decreases the viability of the proposed condominium as North Sudan stands in a
relatively weaker position. Historical condominia concentrating power
inequitably between the parties were restricted to colonial condominia and were
typically unsuccessful in providing for long-term stability.123 As Samuels notes:
"[t]he primary lesson to be drawn from the Sudanese condominium is that the
legal nature of a condominium can be obscured when one State wields a
disproportionate amount of power in the arrangement."1 24 Accordingly, the
proposed condominium should create a dual executive held by representatives
from both North and South Sudan, as was done in the New HebrideS125 and the
Moresnetl26 condominia. Although members of the Executive Council should
ultimately be determined by popular vote, in keeping with the CPA, 12 7 initial
membership of the Council may require appointment by the state governments
of North and South Sudan. Such an arrangement supports the principles of
equal representation and collective-choice arrangements identified by Ostroml 28
while providing for the initial stability required before a shift of control to locally
elected administrators can occur.
D. Legislative Authority
Both the Temporary Agreement and the CPA provide for an "Abyei Area
Council ... to be composed of twenty members."1 29 Although the Temporary
Agreement does not delineate the responsibilities of the Area Council, the
absence of language modifying the CPA in the Temporary Agreement indicates
the continuation of the Council's responsibilities to:

SPLM while the Deputy Chief Administrator and the remaining two heads of state are nominees
of the Government of Sudan).
122

Id at
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Issue local enactments within the powers of local government and on
customary matters; Approve the budget of the Area; Adopt reconstruction,
development and urbanization plans for the Area; If necessary, recommend
to the Presidency the relief of the Chief Administrator or his/her Deputy;
Participate in the promotion of reconciliation efforts in the Area.130
For the purposes of this Comment, the principal points contained within this
delegation of authority are the power to approve the budget, mentioned above,
and the power to recommend removal of the Chief Administrator(s). The power
to issue local enactments appropriate for local government is a potentially broad
delegation of power, but it is unlikely to implicate the broader issues of justice
and security threatening the viability of a long-term agreement in Abyei. The
divided budgetary regime, with the Executive Council recommending a budget
and the Area Council voting on it, comports with several of Ostrom's design
principles: congruence between the rules for appropriation and local conditions,
monitoring systems, and multi-tiered, nested enterprises. 3' Such principles are
similarly reflected in the power given to the Area Council to recommend
removal of the Chief Administrator(s). While such a recommendation requires
bilateral agreement between North and South Sudan if the equality of governing
power is to be preserved,13 2 the mere power of recommendation serves as an
additional check on the concentration of power. Therefore, both the Executive
Council and Area Council as established by the CPA and the Temporary
Agreement are currently well-positioned to transition into the executive and
legislative authority for Abyei under a condominium agreement. Although
changes must be made to accommodate the permanence of a joint sovereignty
regime in the area, the institutional momentum put in place under the two
agreements minimizes the transaction costs in completing condominium
negotiations.
E. Capital Resources
Another principal concern to address in creating a Sudanese condominium
is the just distribution of capital resources in Abyei, including tax and oil
revenues. Financial agreements contained within the CPA entitle the Abyei Area
to tax revenue raised in the Area as well as an equitable portion of national
spending programs allocable to sub-state units. 133 The Temporary Agreement
130
131
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5§4.3.1-4.3.5 (cited in note 29).
Ostrom, Governing the Commons at 59, 102 (cited in note 90).
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characterized by the juridical and functional equality of the members states"'); Samuels, 29 Mich J
Intl L at 773 (cited in note 8) (noting that "[condominia] can only succeed where the
condominium partners are co-equals in authority, with equal rights and obligations").
Protocol on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Abyei Area at § 3.2 (cited in note 29).

Summer 2012

287

ChicagoJournalof InternationalLaw

lacks a provision regarding revenue generated within the Area, though it does
provide that North and South Sudan shall jointly finance the approved budget.134
One principal concern is enforcing equal obligations of both North and South
Sudan to finance the administration of the Abyei Area. The burden of
supporting Abyei must be split equally among the parties to ensure the equitable
balance of control between the states. Therefore, to the extent that
administrative costs exceed local revenues, North and South Sudan must
negotiate the level of capital investment each makes in Abyei to avoid the
problems associated with inequitable control under a condominium.135
Oil revenues present a more complex issue. Oil is one of the region's most
important national resources and provides for a significant portion of both
nations' wealth, while remaining a major source of conflict between them.' 6 The
distribution of oil reserves and pipelines between the two states complicates the
matter. While oil reserves are concentrated more heavily in the South (including
some in Abyei), only the North has readily accessible pipelines to export the
resource for revenue.13 Therefore, under a condominium agreement in Abyei,
two possibilities appear viable for Abyei oil: split revenues while compensating
North Sudan for the transportation of the oil within the Greater Nile Oil
pipeline, or split oil resources, allowing South Sudan to determine alternate
methods to export their share. The CPA provides for the former approach,
awarding 50 percent of the revenues to North Sudan, 42 percent to South
Sudan, and distributing the remaining 8 percent equally among the West
Kordofan and Bahr el Ghazal states and the Ngok Dinka and Misseriya. 3 8 This
approach has the advantage of incentivizing cooperation between the parties to
the condominium on matters apart from oil revenues. A split in the joint
sovereignty of the two states could disrupt the exportation of Abyei oil resources
and therefore provides an added cost to hostilities between the member states.
While previously, the remaining 8 percent of revenues were divided by
demographics and bordering states, the remainder should be returned to local
Abyei administration in order to contribute to the financial security and unity of
the Area.

134
135

Temporay Arrangementsfor the Administration and Secuity of the A byeiArea at
Samuels, 29 Mich J Intl L at 752-53 (cited in note 8).

19 (cited in note 62).

137

See generally Peter Wilkinson, Oil and Power at Center of Vote to Split Sudan (CNN Jan 9, 2011),
(visited Apr
online at http://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/africa/01/04/sudan.qa/index.htm
1, 2012); Alek Nomi, Oil's Impact on the Possibility of Renewed Conflict over South Sudan Independence
(Earth Rights Intl June 9, 2011), online at http://www.earthrights.org/blog/oil-s-impactpossibility-renewed-conflict-over-south-sudan-independence (visited Apr 1, 2012).
Nomi, Oil's Impact on the Possibilityof Renewed Confct over South Sudan Independence (cited in note 136).

138

Protocol on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Abyei Area,

136

288

§ 3.1

(cited in note 29).

Vol 13 No. 1

McNeily

A Condominium Approach to Abyei

F. Oversight and Security
The function of this Comment is to suggest a condominium solution
constructed to avoid further violence and discord within Abyei. But if conflict
were nevertheless to reemerge, the condominium would have to be capable of
containing harm, providing security to Abyei residents, and continuing
governmental administration of Abyei. It is for this purpose that the Temporary
Agreement created the Abyei Joint Oversight Committee, a body composed of
representatives from both states as well as foreign monitors with power to
oversee the functioning of the Executive Council, supervise the interim security
forces and establish local police.'
The Oversight Committee is vital to preserving administrative power in
Abyei should local governance break down. Indeed, the Committee plays a vital
14
and expanding on the multi-tiered nature
role in monitoring local governmento
Ostrom's design principles. Although
which
is
in
line
with
of the administration,
the presence of foreign influence within the Abyei condominium may provoke
criticism, its presence diminishes the likelihood of condominium capture by
either of the signatory parties. Without security in Abyei, the condominium will
be unable to establish institutional momentum through which such outside
intervention may eventually become redundant; but the nascent condominium
has little chance of survival under constant threat of seizure by either of the
sponsoring states. Therefore, foreign monitors will be a necessary part of an
Abyei condominium until the internal administrative bodies overcome the latent
inter-state power struggle within the region.
V. CONCLUSION
The status of Abyei remains a significant obstacle to lasting peace between
the Republic of Sudan and the newly formed Republic of South Sudan.
Heretofore, no viable solution has emerged that can quiet the continuing conflict
in Abyei. However, the states can leverage the recent independence of South
Sudan and establish a condominium agreement for Abyei that settles the primary
concerns of current Abyei residents and provides for lasting peace in the region.
Such a solution was previously untenable because South Sudan was a legal
subordinate to the predecessor state. A condominium agreement, however, must
overcome skepticism from the existing legal-political community and the
obstacles that have blocked negotiations between North and South Sudan in the
past. Despite this, the current interim agreement effectively functions as a
condominium agreement, minimizing the transaction costs in transitioning from
139
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the current administration to a permanent joint sovereignty regime. In sum, a
condominium solution remains the best option, and perhaps the only practical
solution to avoid violence or permanent third-party intervention in Abyei.
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